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I ARTICLES I
Economic Freedom Of Parental Choice




"Freedom of parental choice in education!" is a battle cry now
being heard not only nationally but with special intensity in
Pennsylvania. The movement sounding that cry springs from
several causes: the opinion of many parents that public education
is failing in moral and academic quality; parents' belief that private
education provides a superior alternative; and the widespread
revival of dedication to the religious formation of children
accompanied by fervent support of religious schools.' The
pleaders for "school choice" are met, at the outset, by those who
* William Bentley Ball is counsel to the firm of Ball, Skelly, Murren & Connell in
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. Mr. Ball is a member of both the New York and Pennsylvania
Bars. He is an Adjunct Professor of Law at the Dickinson School of Law of the The
Pennsylvania State University. Mr. Ball received an LL.D. (Hon) from the Dickinson School
of Law in 1995.
1. While Catholic schools, for the past century and a half, have had the predominant
religious school population, evangelical Protestant schools, experiencing a phenomenal
growth since 1970, now form a significant part of the national private school picture. Schools
of the (evangelical) Association of Christian Schools International rose in numbers from
1,294 in 1979 to 3,400 in 1996. In 1955 there were 180 Orthodox Jewish schools nationwide;
today there are more than 500. A similar growth pattern obtains in Pennsylvania.
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ask how any reasonable person can contend that parents in
Pennsylvania today do not have such freedom. They point out that
no Pennsylvania law forbids parents to choose private, including
religious, schools. No Pennsylvania law bars establishing and
operating such schools. 2  Furthermore, the right of parents to
choose such schools for their children has long been held to be a
constitutional right.3
In response to these arguments, school choice proponents
make several points. First they argue that private schools, as well
as public schools, provide education for children. By attending a
private school, a child may obtain the full measure of education
that the law and public policy require. Second, the choice of public
school is paid for out of public funds. The parent who makes the
choice of the other equally, and sometimes better, qualified private
school must pay for it personally while yet paying tax to support
the public school he or she does not elect to use. Third, compul-
sory attendance laws require all parents to choose either public or
private schooling. Fourth, education today is extremely expensive
and, hence, for many of those citizens who choose private schools
for their children, severely burdensome. The economic inequality
between the decision to choose public education and the decision
to choose private education provides the basis for the claim that,
generally, parents who desire nonpublic education for their children
do not really have freedom of choice in education. This lack of
freedom has given rise to the present movement to obtain legisla-
tion whereby parents would receive state financial assistance
popularly called "vouchers," or "school choice" grants.
Historically, pleas for public aid in furtherance of parental
choice of private education have sought direct aid to the schools.
Further, due to the fact that most of the pleaders were supporters
of Catholic schools, the issue presented was popularly described as
the "Catholic school aid question," or "parochiaid." By 1997, the
terms of the debate over the issue and the identity of the pleaders
have changed. The public aid now sought takes the form of aid to
individual parents or to the children, not to institutions. Among
2. Indeed since 1988, Pennsylvania law has been highly protective of religious schools,
especially in terms of undue governmental regulation. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-
1327(b)(1992).
3. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205, 213 (1979).
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the most vigorous pleaders for that kind of aid are evangelical
Protestants and Orthodox Jews!
Opponents of the former programs of direct governmental aid
to religious schools do not regard programs now couched in terms
of educational aid to parents or children as different when
considered in light of provisions of federal and state constitutions
which, some claim, bar the former. While appearances show a
growing consensus that the Constitution of the United States
provides no such bar, many traditional opponents of parental
choice programs now resort to state constitutions as the means for
defeating proposals for such programs.5 This article focuses on the
constitution of one state, Pennsylvania, and analyzes the provisions
that some critics contend would render void the principal parental
choice programs now being proposed in that state.6
I. The Constitutional Roots
The four constitutions of Pennsylvania7 represent, in an
important sense, a continuity of emphasis upon the importance of
religion in our society and a concern for religious liberty. The
frame of government set forth in the Constitution of 1776 spoke of
the importance of "laws for the encouragement of virtue and
prevention of vice and immorality" and concluded that religious
societies should therefore be encouraged.8 William Penn's Frame
of Government For Pennsylvania had sought the creation of schools
for the benefit of the public.9 A colonial statute of 1683 according-
4. The Lutheran Church, Missouri Synod, had long campaigned for economic freedom
of parental choice in education, but today such evangelical groups as the National
Association of Evangelicals and the Southern Baptist Convention have vigorously joined in
taking a similar position.
5. See, e.g., PUBLIC EDUCATION COALITION To OPPOSE TUITION VOUCHERS, STATE
FUNDING OF PENNSYLVANIA'S PRIVATE AND PAROCHIAL SCHOOLS (1994); John Paul Jones,
Pennsylvania's Choice: 'School Choice' and the Pennsylvania Constitution, 66 TEMP. L. REV.
1289 (1993).
6. "The Pennsylvania Constitution clearly prohibits the state from paying tuition
vouchers for private and religious schools, regardless of whether the vouchers are funneled
through the parent or pass directly to the schools." Tuition Vouchers: Testimony Before the
House Education Committee, 179th Legis. 5 (Pa. 1995)(statement of Annette Palutis,
President, Pennsylvania State Education Association).
7. "Four" depending upon whether the Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights of 1776 is
regarded as the first constitution of the Commonwealth.
8. J. PAUL SELSAM, THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION OF 1776: A STUDY IN
REVOLUTIONARY DEMOCRACY 181 (1936).
9. J.P. WICKERSHAM, A HISTORY OF EDUCATION IN PENNSYLVANIA 39 (1886).
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ly provided that such schools would train children to be able to
read the scriptures.1" The Act of April 12, 1838, continued the
theme of the use of public funds to support religious educational
organizations and stated:
Section 13. When a free school of the Common School
grade, shall hereafter be maintained in any accepting school
district, under the care and direction of a religious society, it
shall be lawful for the school directors of such district to cause
to be paid to the proper person or persons, for the support of
such school, any portion of the school money not exceeding the
rateable share of the taxable inhabitants whose children or
apprentices shall be taught in such school: Provided, That the
directors shall be satisfied that such application of the money
would not upon the whole, be injurious to the Common Schools
of the district."
Thus Pennsylvania, from its earliest days, recognized the impor-
tance of schools that provide religious education along with secular
education.
In 1872 Pennsylvania's fourth constitutional convention
assembled.12 It would continue the insistence of prior constitu-
tions on recognition of God, stating, in the new preamble, gratitude
"to Almighty God for His blessings of civil and religious liberty"
and invoking God's guidance. But a new sentiment of animosity
had developed on the subject of subsidizing religious schools. 4
The reasons were twofold. One related to the Catholic Church,
and the other to Protestantism. The 19th Century had witnessed
a virtual explosion in the Catholic population of the nation. 5 This
explosion was unwelcome in the originally, and still solidly,
Protestant United States. 6 A strength of the Catholic Church was
10. Id.
11. Act of April 12, 1838, No. 37 § 13, 1837-38 Pa. Laws 332, 336 (repealed).
12. A.D. HARLAN, PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1872 AND 1873: ITS
MEMBERS AND OFFICERS AND THE RESULT OF THEIR LABORS 22 (1873).
13. Id. at 107.
14. WILLIAM BENTLEY BALL, MERE CREATURES OF THE STATE: EDUCATION,
RELIGION, AND THE COURTS: A VIEW FROM THE COURTROOM 21 (1994).
15. Id. at 21-22.
16. In summary:
In the early 19th century hatred of the Catholic Church, preached as "No Popery"
in pulpits and learned in family life, became hatred of Catholics when unwelcome
boatloads of poverty-stricken Irish began arriving at the ports of Boston and New
York after 1820. Not readily assimilable, these immigrants were deemed
obnoxious cultural aliens; worse, they became a public burden in almshouses. As
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its school system, which the Church's leaders felt was necessary to
safeguard the Catholic faith and to protect Catholic children against
efforts made in the common schools to convert them to Protestan-
tism.17 But as the Catholic schools grew along with the Catholic
population, Protestant majorities in state after state resolved to bar
this burgeoning factor in American society from participating in the
public funding that had long been afforded the predominantly
Protestant religious schools."t That funding had declined as, after
the mid-19th century, the common or public schools began to
flourish. 9 Education in the common schools was state-aided in
Pennsylvania, but that aid diminished after 1834 when the Free
School Law came into existence. 20
The common schools were essentially Protestant in character.
They were characterized by a well-articulated Protestant work
ethic, the employment of Protestant devotions, use of the King
James Bible and a generally Protestant orientation in the teaching
of history, the selection of literature and the religious attitude of
Protestant teachers. This orientation characterized the public
schools until well into the 20th century, and in 1872 it was
pervasive. It provided a powerful assurance to Protestant members
of the new constitutional convention that, if they were to amend
the Constitution to bar funding religious schools, they would not
thereby bar funding to schools of Protestant orientation. The
members of the constitutional convention probably never imagined
a religion-free, secularist public school.21 Amending the Constitu-
the century wore on, Catholics slowly found frigid acceptance in the Protestant
American society, always carefully limited by Protestant rejection of their Church
and intense dislike of Catholic separateness. Catholic separateness derived from
their Church's stem rejection of Protestantism, the forbidding of marriage with
Protestants except upon conditions unacceptable to most Protestants, and its
insistence on building its own social institutions, especially schools.
17. THEODORE ROEMER, THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN THE UNITED STATES 288-90 (3d
ed. 1954).
18. HAROLD A. BuETow, THE CATHOLIC SCHOOL ITS ROOTS, IDENTITY AND FUTURE
24 (1958).
19. WICKERSHAM, supra note 9, at 388.
20. Id.
21. Horace Mann, the nineteenth century's great exponent of American public schools,
opposing all sectarian instruction in the public schools, nevertheless saw the public school
system as one which "earnestly inculcates all Christian morals," and he vigorously denied
that he had "even attempted to exclude religious instruction from the schools, or to exclude
the Bible from the schools, or to impair the force of that volume." 2 ANSON PHELPS STOKES,
CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 57 (1950).
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tion would at once stem the tide of demands of the Catholic
schools to participate in public funds and assure the continuation
of essentially Christian education. The convention thus adopted
Article III, Section 18, barring appropriations for charitable,
educational or benevolent purposes to sectarian institutions and
Article III, Section 17, barring use of public school funds for the
support of sectarian education.
While a limited Constitutional Convention meeting in 1967
produced Pennsylvania's fifth constitution, it effected no change in
the 1874 clauses relating to religion. Opponents of programs of
public aid to parents to support education for their children in
private schools have focused on three of those clauses (as renum-
bered in 1967): Article I, Section 3; Article III, Section 15 (the
former Article III, Section 17); and Article III, Section 29 (the
former Article III, Section 18).
II. The "Parental Choice" Proposal
For purposes of understanding the present "school choice"
controversy in Pennsylvania, a summary of the salient features of
"parental choice" proposals being considered is useful.4
A. Justification of the Measure as Public Policy
The proposal provides findings that it is "the policy of the
Commonwealth to enhance the primary right and obligation of
parents to choose the education and training of their school-age
children", and that "[a]n educated populace is essential to the
political and economic health of the Commonwealth."'
22. These are the features common to measures proposed in the General Assembly in
prior years and in recent proposals of Pennsylvania Governor Thomas Ridge and the House
Republican majority. See, e.g., H.R. 1655, 176th Reg. Sess. (Pa. 1993).
23. The full text of the findings is as follows:
(1) It is the policy of the Commonwealth to enhance the primary right and
obligations of parents to choose the education and training of their school-age
children; (2) An educated populace is essential to the political and economic
health of the Commonwealth; (3) Providing educational opportunities for the
children of this Commonwealth is a governmental duty and a matter of legitimate
concern; (4) The legitimate interest and governmental duty of the Commonwealth
in the citizens of this Commonwealth, will better prepare these citizens to compete
for employment opportunities, will foster development of a more capable and
better-educated work force and will better enable the Commonwealth to fulfil its
governmental duty of providing an opportunity to receive a quality education to
children.
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B. Cash Grants to Parents of Children Attending a Public or
Nonpublic School
The grants made to parents are for tuition and derived from
appropriations made by the General Assembly. The parent must
be a person whose taxable income is within a defined low level.
The nonpublic school must meet the requirements of the compul-
sory school attendance law and the applicable requirements of Title
VI of the U.S. Civil Rights Act of 1964.
III. The 1996 "Parental Choice" Proposal In Light Of The
Pennsylvania Constitution
A. Article I, Section 3: Non-Establishment
Article I, Section 3 is often described as the Pennsylvania
Constitution's "non-establishment" clause. In relevant part, the
Section provides, "[N]o man can of right be compelled to ...
support any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry against
his consent; ... and no preference shall ever be given by law to
any religious establishment or modes of worship."'  This section
is regularly cited by opponents of aid to parents of children
enrolled in religious schools. In Springfield School District v.
Department of Education,' for example, litigants challenging the
state's funding of bus transportation to such children relied in part
upon that section.' The Pennsylvania Supreme Court thus
considered whether Section 3 provided "more stringent limitation
upon the church-state relationship than does the federal constitu-
tion."'27 The court stated, "[T]he limitations contained in our
constitution do not extend beyond those announced by the United
States Supreme Court in interpreting the first amendment to the
federal constitution."'  The court stressed the point by quoting
from its earlier opinion in Wiest v. Mt. Lebanon School District,29
which stated "[tihe protection of rights and freedoms secured by
this section [Article I, section 3] of our Constitution, however, does
24. PA. CONST. art. I, § 3.
25. 397 A.2d 1154 (1979).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1170.
28. Id.
29. 320 A.2d 362 (1974).
1997]
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not transcend the protection of the first amendment of the United
States Constitution.,
30
Because protection of religious freedom in Pennsylvania is
coextensive with the protection provided by the First Amendment,
the Supreme Court's interpretation of the non-establishment clause
of the federal constitution in cases involving tax expenditures
related to religious entities is relevant. Two lines of decision are
apparent in these cases: (a) those barring direct subsidy of religious
institutions or agencies and (b) those sanctioning the achievement
of public purposes through aid to individuals served by religious
institutions or agencies.
1. The subsidy cases.--Many advocates' briefs opposing forms
of "parental choice" legislation have relied upon the sweeping
dictum in Everson v. Board of Education. They frequently quote
Justice Black's statement that "[n]o tax in any amount, large or
small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institu-
tions" because the Establishment Clause was "intended to erect 'a
wall of separation between Church and State."'32 The Supreme
Court further elaborated the interpretation of the Establishment
Clause in School District of Abington Township v. Schempp.33
The Schempp case involved religious exercises in public schools, but
broadly held the Establishment Clause to bar any legislation
lacking a "secular legislative purpose" and having a "primary effect
that advances or inhibits religion."34
In 1968, the Pennsylvania Nonpublic Education and Secondary
Education Act was adopted in Pennsylvania to provide for state use
of public funds to purchase secular educational services from
nonpublic, including religious, sehools" The legislation was
challenged in federal court as violative of the Everson "no aid"
interpretation of the Establishment Clause.36  In Lemon v.
30. Springfield Sch. Dist., 397 A.2d at 1170 (quoting Wiest v. Mt. Lebanon Sch. Dist.,
320 A.2d at 366).
31. 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1974)(quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)).
32. Id.
33. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
34. Id. at 222.
35. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 5601-5608 (repealed 1977). The Act provided that the
state would pay the salaries of teachers in nonpublic schools for instruction rendered in
mathematics, modem foreign languages, physical science and physical education. The state
would also pay for secular textbooks and instructional materials in those subjects. Id.
36. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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Kurtzman 7 the Supreme Court of the United States held not only
that the Act violated Everson's interpretation, but also that it
violated the Establishment Clause on a ground first articulated only
the year previous in a case involving property tax exemptions of
religious institutions." The court had held, in this tax exemption
case, that the legislation transgressed the Establishment Clause by
creating excessive entanglements between government and religious
institutions." The Pennsylvania act, said the Lemon Court,
created "excessive entanglements" of three kinds: (1) the state
would have to monitor the classrooms of aided students to assure
the "secular" subjects were taught without infusion of religion; (2)
the state would have to audit a church-related schools' financial
records to determine which of its expenditures were religious; and
(3) the fact that the Act had been generated by political activity,
and future appropriations under it would invoke such activity,
created "potential division along religious lines."'
The "no aid," "purpose and effect," and "excessive entangle-
ments" thrusts of Everson, Schempp and Lemon continued in a
series of U.S. Supreme Court decisions striking down legislation
aimed at providing state subsidies to religious institutions for
educational purposes.4"
2. The cases on aid to individuals.-A parallel line of
decisions from 1947 to the present holds that the Establishment
Clause is not violated where government supports public objectives
by affording material aid to individuals exercising a choice to be
served by religious educational institutions. While Everson is
37. I&
38. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
39. Id. at 675.
40. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622-23.
41. Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973) (state reimbursement of tuition exclusively to
parents of nonpublic school students); Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973)(tuition grants and other benefits limited exclusively to parents
of children attending nonpublic schools); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975)(state-
provided auxiliary services and loans of instructional materials and equipment to nonpublic
schools); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977)(loan of materials exclusively to nonpublic
schools); School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985)(state payment of public
school employees for secular educational services rendered on religious school premises);
Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985)(federal funding of public employees offering, on
nonpublic school premises, supplemental educational programs to educationally deprived
children from low-income families).
1997]
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famous for its dictum proclaiming a wall of church-state separa-
tion,42 its precise holding was that tax-supported bus transporta-
tion could validly be furnished to children in religious schools, even
delivering them to the very school door.43 The decision held that
Establishment Clause considerations must yield to the commanding
principles of the Free Exercise Clause." The Court summarized
its point noting that while tax-raised funds may not be used to
support "an institution which teaches the tenets and faith of any
church," the Free Exercise Clause commands that government
"cannot exclude individual Catholics, Lutherans, Mohammedans,
Baptists, Jews, Methodists, Non-believers, Presbyterians, or the
members of any other faith, because of their faith, or lack of it,
from receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation.,
4
1
Following this teaching was the Court's 1968 decision in Board
of Education v. Allen,46 which addressed the constitutionality of
a state's loan of textbooks to nonpublic school children.47 The
Court noted that the program served the public purpose of aiding
the education of children and that they, not the schools they
attended, were the program's primary beneficiaries.48 Additional-
ly, the court noted that the loan of textbooks by the state was a
general program, adding nonpublic school children to the existing
class of public school beneficiaries and that the books loaned were
secular in content.49
In 1983 in Mueller v. Allen,50 the Court held that a Minnesota
statute providing tax deductions by parents for public and nonpub-
lic school expenses did not violate the Establishment Clause.5'
These expenses included broadly defined tuition, textbook and
transportation costs.52  Applying the Schempp "purpose and
effect" test, the Court stated, in reference to purpose:
A state's decision to defray the cost of educational
expenses incurred by parents-regardless of the type of schools
42. 330 U.S. 1 (1974).
43. Id at 18.
44. Id. at 16.
45. Id.
46. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 243-44.
49. Id at 245.
50. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
51. Id. at 403.
52. Id. at 390 nn.1-2.
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their children attend-evidences a purpose that is both secular
and understandable. An educated populace is essential to the
political and economic health of any community, and a state's
efforts to assist parents in meeting the rising cost of educational
expenses plainly serves this secular purpose of ensuring that the
state's citizenry is well-educated. Similarly, Minnesota, like
other states, could conclude that there is a strong public interest
in assuring the continued financial health of private schools,
both sectarian and non-sectarian. By educating a substantial
number of students, such schools relieve public schools of a
correspondingly great burden to the benefit of all taxpayers. In
addition, private schools may serve as a benchmark for public
schools in a manner analogous to the "TVA yardstick" for
private power companies. 3
Nor did the Court find any defect in the statute under the "primary
effect" wing of the Schempp test.54  The court noted that the
deduction was available to both public and nonpublic school
parents55 and that whatever assistance it may have afforded to
religious schools, "under Minnesota's arrangement public funds
become available only as a result of numerous private choices of
individual parents of school-age children.,56 Thus, any "imprima-
tur of State approval" was avoided.57 In addition, the Court did
not find an excessive state entanglement with religion in the
statute.58
In 1986, the Court continued the Everson-Allen-Mueller line of
development in Witters v. Washington Department of Services for
the Blind.59 In Witters, a blind student sought public money,
under Washington's vocational rehabilitation program, for his
education at a Bible institute.' A unanimous Supreme Court
held that the state could pay his tuition without violating the
Establishment Clause.61 Central to the Court's thinking was the
fact that no "direct subsidy" to the Bible school was involved.62
53. Id. at 395.
54. Id. at 396.
55. Id. at 397.
56. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 399.
57. Id. (quoting Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 (1981)).
58. Id.
59. 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 482.
62. Id. at 487.
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Instead, like the busing program in Everson, a public welfare
benefit was being made available generally without regard to the
sectarian-nonsectarian or public-nonpublic nature of the institution
benefitted."'  Then, in 1993, in Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills
School District,' the Court upheld, over an Establishment Clause
objection, a state's use of tax funds to support the services of a sign
language interpreter to a deaf high school student on the premises
of a religious school.'
Thus, under the federal constitution, direct subsidy of religious
institutions is prohibited by the Establishment Clause, while tax-
supported pubic interest programs, benefitting individuals and
achieved in religious institutions, are valid where: (a) the individual
and not the institution is the primary beneficiary of the aid; (b)
when it is the individual's choice, not that of government, which
triggers the aid; (c) the governmental program provides benefits to
a broad class of citizens; and (d) the program is religiously
"neutral." This neutrality requires that the program not be
primarily religious in character, create no greater or broader
benefits to recipients who apply their aid to religious education,
and not limit the benefits in whole or part to students at religious
institutions.
The federal Establishment Clause bears directly on questions
arising, not only under Article I, Section 3, but also on the similar
questions arising under other sections of the Constitution of
Pennsylvania. The "parental choice" proposal appears to be a valid
tax-supported public interest program similar to those previously
approved by the Supreme Court. Therefore, the proposal must be
deemed unobjectionable under the provisions of the Pennsylvania
Constitution.
This conclusion is greatly strengthened by the reasoning of the
Supreme Court of the United States in Agostini v. Felton.66 There
the Court held the Aguilar and Grand Rapids decisions to be "no
longer good law" in light of Zobrest.67 Thus, arguments by school
choice opponents, based on those overruled decisions as guidelines
63. Id. (quoting Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
756, 782-83 n.38 (1973)).
64. 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993).
65. Id. at 2464.
66. 1997 WL 338583 (U.S.).
67. Id.
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for interpretation of the Pennsylvania Constitution, would no
longer appear useful.
B. Article III, Section 15: Public School Money
Article III, Section 15 of the Pennsylvania constitution
provides, "No money raised for the support of the public schools
of the Commonwealth shall be appropriated to or used for the
support of any sectarian school."62 The parental choice proposal
clearly does not offend this provision of the constitution. The plain
language69 of Section 15 does not reach the parental choice
provision. The voucher or educational opportunity grant does not
consist of any money raised for the support of the public schools.
Rather, it is money distinctly earmarked for parents and the
support of their new, statutory power of school choice. That being
so, no question logically arises with respect to whether or not that
money would be "appropriated to or used for the support of any
sectarian school."
Opponents of voucher legislation, seemingly ignoring the
critical phrase "raised for the support of the public schools,"
characterize the legislation as calling for the support of sectarian
schools. The argument is not new. In 1965, legislation enacted in
Pennsylvania calling for the use of public funds to provide
transportation to children attending nonpublic schools was
challenged as violating inter alia, Article III, Section 15, but the
challenge was unsuccessful. 70  The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, in Rhoades v. School District of Abington
Township,71 held that the legislation did not involve the support
of any sectarian school, even though payment for transportation of
the religious school children was actually from money raised for the
support of the public schools.72  The court noted that, under
existing law, "children in sectarian schools receive tax-supported
health services., 73  The court pointed out further provisions of
68. PA. CONST. art. III, § 15.
69. Under the Statutory Construction Act, "when the words of a statute are clear and
free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing
its spirit." 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1921(b) (1995). The established rules of construction
applicable to statutes apply also in the construction of the Constitution. Peoples Bridge Co.
v. Shroyer, 58 Dauph. 25 (1946), affd, 50 A.2d 499 (1947).
70. Rhoades v. School Dist. of Abington Township, 226 A.2d 53 (1967).
71. Id




Pennsylvania statutes conferring tax-supported benefits to nonpub-
lic school children:
The Public School Code provides for children, without
distinguishing between public and nonpublic schools, many
facilities, as, for instance, medical, dental and nurse services
(§ 14-1401 et seq.); driver safety (§ 15-1519); food and milk
supply (§ 13-1335): board and lodging (§ 13-1367), tuition and
maintenance of blind, deaf and cerebral palsied children (§ 13-
1376). The Public School Code provides that school district
funds may be used for traffic safety purposes: "The board of
directors of any school district acting alone or with another
district or districts, may contribute funds to another political
subdivision for the blinkers or other like traffic control devices."
(1949, March 10, EL. § 526, added 1965, Dec. 1, EL. 1002,
§ 124 P.S. § 5-526).
On the basis of logic and sustained reasoning it would be
absurd to allow nonpublic school children into all these public
services but deny them a ride on a bus to attend a school
conforming to the requirements of the State education pro-
gram.
74
The Court went so far as to say that "[w]here children are involved,
the laws of the Commonwealth make no distinction between public
school and nonpublic school pupils."75 Whatever other objections
may be raised to the "parental choice" legislation, Article III,
Section 15 does not stand as a bar.
74. Id. at 59.
75. Id. at 58. In 1995, payments by Commonwealth agencies for individual educational
purposes included: payments under the Urban and Rural Teacher Loan Forgiveness Act,
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 5191-5197 (1992); for educational costs for dependent and
delinquent children in private residential institutions, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 9-964.1; for
education and training of children found to be uneducable in the public schools, PA .STAT.
ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1375; for tuition of exceptional children in approved private schools, PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1376; for tuition of deaf and blind children in chartered schools, PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1376.1; for tuition of cerebral palsied, brain-damaged, muscular
dystrophied, socially or emotionally disturbed, or mentally retarded children in special
institutions, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1377; for the education of blind children under 8
years if age, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1380; for tuition by school districts for attendance
by a student in another district, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1313; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24,
§ 16-1608; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 25-2562; payments by Pennsylvania school districts of
tuition for a resident student attending school in another state, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-
1315; by school district of tuition for expelled students, 22 PA. CODE § 12.6(e)(2)(1995); to
parents for costs of transporting their children to and from schools, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24,
§ 13-1362; by counties for tuition for children in orphanages or children's homes, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 24, § 1307; payments of tuition for vocational education, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24,
§ 18-1809.
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C. Article III, Section 29: Aid to Persons for Public Purposes
Article III, Section 29, is frequently cited by opponents of
programs that aid parents in educating their children in religious
schools. Specifically, opponents cite to the words of Section 29
which state that "No appropriation shall be made for charitable,
educational, or benevolent purposes to any person or community
nor to any denominational and sectarian institution, corporation or
association."76
At the outset, it should be noted that the "school choice"
proposal does not involve any appropriation to any person. The
debates at the 1872 constitutional convention show, the phrase "any
person or community" was regarded as distinct from the phrase
respecting "any denominational or sectarian institution., 77  As
Delegate Ewing stated, "[t]here is a marked distinction between
appropriations for aid to sectarian or denominational institutions
and appropriations to 'persons and communities."'78  Delegate
Dallas, in further comment on the "person or community" phrase,
stated that "certainly it is not intended to provide that no appropri-
ation shall be made to any person."79 In fact, the phrase was
intended to eliminate scandals created by the use of state treasury
funds for purposes that served only individuals or localities and
failed to benefit the statewide public interest.'0 As Delegate
Mann explained, "[t]his section is simply ... to prevent invidious
appropriations to local individuals and communities."'"
The delegates cited case after case in which pleaders for
special interests had managed to obtain state money for private
causes, worthless local enterprises,' or compensation to communi-
ties which had suffered from fires or natural disasters.' The
special and narrow character of these appropriations prompted the
convention to adopt the "person or community" language.'
76. PA. CONST. art. III, § 29.
77. 2 DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION To AMEND THE CONSTITUTION OF
PENNSYLVANIA 648-95 (Harrisburg, Pa., Benjamin Singerly, State Printer, 1873)[hereinafter
DEBATES].
78. Id at 667.
79. Id. at 648.
80. See id. at 694.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 617.
83. DEBATES, supra note 77, at 649.
84. See it at 670.
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Consequently, the delegates, focusing on the purposes for which
they would forbid appropriations to "any person or community,"
stressed their opposition to special appropriations even to these
gratuities. 5 The delegates did not intend the provision's language
to prevent the legislature from making appropriations to individuals
or communities when such action is necessary to the performance
of governmental duties.86
Critics also challenge the "school choice" proposal as calling
for appropriations in violation of the second phrase of Section 29,
which forbids appropriations to denominational or sectarian
institutions.' Seventy-five years ago, in Collins v. Kephart," the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the section was intended to
"divorce, absolutely, church and state," and "to forbid the state
from giving.., any recognition to a religious sect or denomination,
even in the fields of public charity and education." 9 In 1927 the
court revisited the subject of devoting Commonwealth funds to
sectarian institutions in Collins v. Martin,9° a case involving an
appropriation to the Department of Public Welfare to pay for the
treatment of indigent persons in religious hospitals.91 Here again,
the court held the expenditure violated Section 29.92
In 1956 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court initiated a sharp
departure from this absolutist reading of the section, which
paralleled the similar departure of the Supreme Court of the
United States from the total separationism expressed by Justice
Black in Everson. The case, Schade v. Allegheny County Institu-
tional District,93 involved a challenge to payments of public funds
made by a county institution district to ten sectarian institutions for
the support of dependent and neglected children who had been
placed in the institutions by order of a juvenile court.94 The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held the district's payments did not
violate Article III, Section 29.9' The court held that, in effect, the
85. See, e.g., iii at 642.
86. See, e.g., id. at 641, 681-82.
87. PA. CONST. art. III, § 29.
88. 117 A. 440 (1921).
89. Id. at 441.
90. 139 A. 122 (1927).
91. 1i.
92. Id. at 127.
93. 126 A.2d 911 (1956).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 914.
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payments constituted "neither a charity nor a benevolence, but a
governmental duty."96  The court's decision also rested on two
further points. First, the court explained that the Commonwealth
could, without violating Section 29, purchase needed public services
from qualified sectarian agencies:
The Constitution does not prohibit the State or any of its
agencies from doing business with denominational or sectarian
institutions, nor from paying just debts to them when incurred
at its direction or with its approval. Numerous cases can be
readily visualized where such situation have occurred: i.e.
payment of the bill of an injured employee to a sectarian
hospital. 7
Second, the court grounded its decision on the child benefit theory
previously propounded by the United States Supreme Court in
Cochran v. Louisiana State Board of Education.98
All the plaintiffs proved was that the monies received by
the defendant institutions were in partial reimbursement for the
cost of room and board of such minors. The services had been
rendered before partial payments on account of same was
received. A considerable part of this money is recouped by the
Juvenile Court from the parents of these minor wards. The
balance of the funds so expended are, in legal effect, payments
to the child-not the institution supporting and maintaining him
or her.'
Schade, therefore, involved tax funds paid to institutions for
services rendered by them in providing needed help for children.
Twenty-one years later, the Rhoades decision would rely upon
Schade in upholding the use of public funds for bus transportation
to children attending religious schools."°
In 1979, in Springfield School District v. Department of
Education,° the Pennsylvania Supreme Court expanded the
teaching of both Schade and Rhoades in a case challenging an
amendment to the Rhoades busing law which expanded the area of
bus transportation of religious school children beyond school
96. l
97. Id. (quoting Cochran v. Board of Educ., 281 U.S. 370, 374-5 (1980)).
98. 281 U.S. 370, 375 (1930).
99. Schade, 126 A.2d at 914.
100. Rhoades v. School Dist. of Abington Township, 226 A.2d 53 (1967). See supra notes
70-74 and accompanying text.
101. 397 A.2d 1154 (1979).
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district boundary lines.1" In upholding the amended statute in
the face of both federal and state constitutional objections, the
court rejected the concept of an absolute "wall of separation" of
church and state in favor of the concept of "benevolent neutrali-
ty."" The latter concept, the court explained, "does not require
a degree of governmental detachment whereby the state becomes
the adversary of religion or insensitive to its needs."'" The
Court turned to the precise holding of Everson:
Thus governmental action is not necessarily prescribed because
it results in a benefit to an institution, provided the benefit is
indirect and incidental. E.g., Everson v. Board of Education,
supra. Moreover, the determination as to whether a benefit is
indirect and incidental is principally a question of degree.'05
It appears, therefore, that in a case involving the application
of Section 29 to the "school choice" proposal, the Pennsylvania
courts will observe the same test that the Supreme Court of the
United States has observed in Establishment Clause cases with
similar facts. Under that test, the proposal will be upheld because:
(1) the program is general in scope;1" (2) because of the
Commonwealth's supreme interest in the education of children and
the general scope, the program serves an important public interest
and, under the Schempp test, there can be no doubt that the
program has a secular legislative purpose; (3) individuals, both
children and their parents, will be the primary beneficiaries of the
assistance provided by the program, and their choice triggers the
aid; and, (4) while tuition money under the legislation would
ultimately go to religious and other nonpublic schools, the program
as a whole is not religious in character, nor does it create greater
benefits to recipients who apply its aid to religious education, or
limit the benefits to such students' 7
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1159.
104. Id
105. Id.
106. The scope of the program is general if its benefits are being offered to children, and
thus parents, in both public and nonpublic schools-the "broad class" deemed requisite in
the legislation reviewed in Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968), and Mueller v.
Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
107. The education of the children who attend religious schools meets all legitimate
secular education requirements. Although students in religious schools also receive religious
education, it is not likely the "primary effect" of the proposed legislation. In other words,
any aid to the school is an indirect, incidental and attenuated benefit to the school.
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IV. Equality And Free Exercise Concerns
The resolution of Everson rested simultaneously on the Free
Exercise Clause and the concept of equality of treatment that
prohibits the government from allocating benefits on the basis of
faith or lack of it. Neither the Pennsylvania constitution nor the
United States Constitution would require voidance of the "parental
choice" statute. The "parental choice" proposal, however, has the
obvious aim of bringing its intended beneficiaries up to parity, both
in benefits and in freedom to choose, with citizens who already
enjoy those benefits through the tax-funded government schools.
Neither the Supreme Court of the United States nor the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania has yet ruled in a case in which the parents
of a child enrolled in a religious school have claimed that the
denial, to that parent or child, of a specific public welfare benefit
enjoyed by all public school parents and children was a denial of
religious liberty or of equal protection of the laws. Should the
"parental choice" proposal become law in Pennsylvania, it is
foreseeable that litigants will make such a claim when defending
that law.
The Everson-Zobrest sequence of holdings and the concept of
equal treatment lend the argument plausibility. The parental
choice proposal equalizes the benefits the government provides for
the children in both public and nonpublic schools. To except the
latter from the class of beneficiaries would amount to the creation
of a governmental classification based on religion."8  In 1975
former Chief Justice Burger, dissenting in Meek v. Pittenger,10 9
pointed to a significant relationship between free exercise and
equal protection concepts in words prophetic of the later decisions
in Mueller, Witters and Zobrest:
One can only hope that, at some future date, the Court will
come to a more enlightened view of the First Amendment's
guarantee of free exercise of religion, thus eliminating the
denial of equal protection to children in church-sponsored
schools, and take a more realistic step toward establishing a
state religion-at least while this Court sits.n0
108. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488,491-92 (1961); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618,627
(1978).
109. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
110. Id. at 387.
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This view, taken by the Supreme Court of United States in a
challenge of the federal constitutionality of the parental choice
legislation, would undoubtedly be taken by the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania as the standard to be followed under the Pennsylvania
Constitution's equal protection clause, Article I, Section 26.111
Conclusion
While significant opposition to parental choice legislation exists
in Pennsylvania, the opponents are unlikely to be successful in
attacking such provisions using the identified provisions of the
Pennsylvania Constitution. Instead, in light of prior, logical analysis
of like or similar provisions in closely analogous situations, a
parental choice provision will be able to withstand scrutiny by the
Pennsylvania courts under the constitution of the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania.
111. Love v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 597 A.2d 1137 (1991).
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